What are the politics of, and prospects for, contemporary weapons control? Human rights and humanitarian activists and scholars celebrate the gains made in the UN Arms Trade Treaty as a step towards greater human security. Critics counter that the treaty represents an accommodation with global militarism. Taking the tensions between arms transfer control and militarism as my starting point, I argue that the negotiating process and eventual treaty text demonstrate competing modes of militarism. Expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, all three modes are underpinned by ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered and classed relations of asymmetry and hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality. This means human security is a form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it. Drawing on primary sources from negotiations and participant observation with actors involved in the campaign for the ATT, the argument challenges the idea that human security has scored a victory over militarism. It also complicates our understanding of the nature of the accommodation with it, demonstrating the transformation as well as entrenchment of contemporary militarism. The argument reframes the challenges for controlling weapons circulation, placing the necessity for feminist, postcolonial anti-militarist critique front and centre.
goal of reducing human suffering, and the inclusion of IHL and human rights standards in its provisions. Scholar and practitioner proponents hope that the treaty will "diminish the human cost of the poorly regulated arms trade," 1 with the effect of "humanizing international security." 2 Activists and scholars have attempted to elevate human rights and humanitarian concerns for the broad swathe of the world's population above the political economy and -a challenge that was to resurface during the ATT negotiations. Regulating the conventional arms trade as a whole cannot take a purely disarmament or humanitarian frame, given its deeply entrenched legitimacy. This makes the ATT a human security initiative rather than a primarily humanitarian arms control or disarmament one 8 -whilst it has the reduction of human suffering as a named purpose, this sits alongside "international and regional peace, security and stability" in Article 1 of the text. As Martin and Owen put it, "The idea of arms control is appealing to proponents of human security because it sets out to control tools of violence, as well as seeking to curb the dominance of the state in determining the forms of insecurity to which policy solutions must be found." 9 Jody Williams, founding coordinator of the ICBL, calls on governments and civil society to work together, including on initiatives like the ATT, "to advance human security as a viable alternative to militarism and violence and war." 10 Sympathetic criticism of the ATT has been aired from within the academic and scholar-practitioner community. Bolton and James argue that the treaty represents a "melding" of a "'maximalist' human security-civil society approach with concerns of developing countries and the 'minimalist' strategic and commercial interests of the major arms exporters." 11 Chinkin and Kaldor argue that "the humanitarian achievements" of post-Cold War weapons control "need to be complemented by disarmament." That is, as 8 20 In relation to arms control, I have argued elsewhere that the ATT has been mobilised by liberal democratic states primarily to legitimise their arms transfer practices. 21 And Cooper concludes that "campaigners need to return to a strategic contestation of global militarism rather than searching for tactical campaign victories dependent on accommodation with the language and economic and security paradigms of contemporary military humanism." 22 This is part of a political economy critique of the way "the regulation of pariah weapons might alternatively be described as 'arms control from below within the logic of militarism from above'," 23 in line with a wider critique of human security as having been "institutionalised and co-opted to work in the interests of global capitalism, militarism and neoliberal governance." 24 Cooper and Mutimer, surveying the history of and prospects for controlling the means of violence, argue that "the longer term, indirect effect should be to reduce militarism and promote cultures of peace" or "at the very least, avoid further embedding cultures of militarism." 25 How, then, should we think about the impact of the human security agenda on militarism, and vice versa; and what are the ramifications for weapons control?
From militarism to human security -and back via the imperial turn
The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which formalised the human security agenda, was explicit about the role of "excessive militarization and the international arms trade" as a "critical source of insecurity." 26 Arising from "the world's previous preoccupation with deterrence and territorial security," arms transfers, military assistance, proxy wars, excessive military spending, politicised militaries in developing countries, and the military-industrial complex, were all identified as impediments to the realisation of human security. 27 The report identified concrete policy recommendations, including an international agreement to phase out military assistance; a list of prohibited items for transfer; a strengthened UN Register reporting system; the regulation and elimination of subsidies; and a tax on arms sales to finance peacekeeping. 28 Such moves, alongside increased spending on demilitarisation efforts, were envisaged as "an important step towards achieving human security." 29 Whilst there was an emphasis on "Third World disarmament," the report was clear that this must be one component of a "blueprint for global disarmament." 30 So here we have an agenda for practical action on the weapons trade, challenging militarism to improve human security. The UNDP report identified the nation-statist ideologies of deterrence and territorial security, as well as the transnational practices of military assistance and proxy wars, as key causes of insecurity. Simultaneously, it reopened the debate about the link between security and development "that had been closed since the somewhat sterile polemic around the link between disarmament and development" of the 1970s and 1980s. 31 This earlier, now ostensibly outdated debate surmised that "the North (i.e. both sides of the East-West conflict) should disarm, and devote the resources freed up by arms reduction to development in the South." 32 As part of this shift in debate, the move away from state-centred definitions of security was accompanied by an acknowledgment of the legitimate and crucial role of the state in providing security -especially as security was emphasised as a precondition for development. So the anti-militarist call that identified the state as a creator of insecurity 26 was balanced against recognition of the legitimate role of the state in providing security.
There was also a downgrading of military threats as a particular type of threat to human security: military threats do not appear as one of the seven main categories articulated in the report (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, political).
Rather, threats from war (defined as "Threats from other states") are listed under the category of "personal security", alongside threats of physical torture and ethnic tension, as well as crime, rape, domestic violence, and suicide. 33 The analytical and political move made in the 1994 UNDP Report was to equate war with the state and move away from a concern with territorially-based definitions of security and inter-state war, which it equates with militarism. There is a shift in focus to the spectrum of armed violence and non-conflict violence, which are to be remedied in the name of human security, in part through the (re)construction of legitimate coercive apparatuses. The shift away from militarism and towards human security claims to acknowledge the changing character of conflict and the role of the state in monopolizing legitimate violence, without privileging it unthinkingly. Research in this vein has flourished in the years since the 1994 report, and brings significant advantages to bear over traditional state-centric analyses, such as the ability to account for the geographical diversity of rates of armed violence within as well as between states; sustained and distinct attention to gendered patterns of violence, including the specific character of femicide as a distinct form of violence; and the incorporation of questions of public health and socio-economic inequality into discussion about weapons transfers. 34 For all these developments, the human security agenda's take on war, conflict and armed violence has not been without its critics. It has been described as the "new orthodoxy" that is "unable to provide the basis for a substantive change of the system of international security," despite finding "the old language of interstate war and conflict … lacking." 35 Similarly, its emphasis on "progressive" initiatives such as "eliminat [ing] certain types of weapons" stands accused of failing to adequately examine "the pathologies inherent in the structure of the international system" that generate such challenges. 36 And when the "human" in human security is naturalised as masculine, the inclusion of novel threats and new actors leaves the parameters of security untouched, meaning that "state-based, militarised security remains unchallenged." 37 Feminist scholars have critiqued the gendered concepts and practices of war, peace, militarization, peacekeeping and soldiering, going well beyond the human security framework in the process. 38 Feminist critiques that challenge the parameters of human security can usefully be combined with postcolonial accounts of IR that emphasise the ways in which the discipline "can both deny empire while simultaneously normalizing an imperial perspective on the world." 39 Some of the main themes of the human security agenda are illustrative of the need for an imperial perspective in how we understand the challenges facing weapons control. By this I mean interpreting them with the aid of scholarship that challenges methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism in its analysis, mobilises feminist critiques of militarism, and puts the legacy of empire and colonialism, and the racial, gendered and classed politics of imperial control, front and centre in its assessment of contemporary challenges. 40 Deploying such resources gives us a chance to rethink some of the key assumptions around human security and the prospects for regulating weapons circulation. Three core themes of the human security agenda are ripe for an imperial critique.
First, the claim that the character of conflict has changed, from inter-state war towards internal conflict, has become axiomatic in much of IR, including the human security literature. 41 The greatest threats to human security are deemed to stem from internal conflict and criminal violence, or the state itself, rather than from an external adversary as per the traditional security agenda. As such, "international security traditionally defined -territorial integrity -does not necessarily correlate with human security." 42 Second, the changing character of conflict requires a shift in the referent object of security, according to the human security agenda: away from the state and inter-state war, and towards the individual and the broader range of threats they face. 43 And third, the human security agenda nonetheless emphasises the importance of the state's monopoly on legitimate violence and role in security provision. 44 Yet the circumstances have been transformed with the end of the Cold War. Kaldor attributes a "profound restructuring of political authority" to the new wars, and sees human security as an opportunity for "reconstructing political authority in the context of the processes we call globalisation." 45 Hence the need for security sector reform (SSR), demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and other reforms of coercive practices and apparatuses.
Each of these three themes is premised on the significance of the rupture that occurred with the end of the Cold War. But understanding the Cold War as predominantly an East-West ideological and geopolitical confrontation marginalises longer historical patterns of North-South power relations and conflict, and of hot war in the South. And the increased focus on internal conflict, whilst fruitful in terms of changing the scale of analysis, risks disconnecting the micro-politics of violence from broader systems and structures of war preparation, ignoring one of the key lessons of feminist scholarship, which is that the scales or so-called levels of analysis are interdependent. As Sjoberg and 41 The key figure here is Mary Kaldor, central to both the new wars literature and the human security agenda. Via put it, "absolutely distinguishing between the personal, national and international level of war and militarism lacks conceptual and empirical rigor at best": feminist attention allows us to understand both the impact of war and militarism on people In many accounts, human security has been mobilised as an attempt to "cope with [the] pathological results" of how security has been defined in post-colonial states in the South. 54 Yet this encourages internalist analysis that sees the problems of armed violence as having their sources primarily within the global South. In conceding the terms of debate to "traditional" security studies, and seeking to shift inwards from the state to the individuals living within it, rather than critiquing the conception of the international system, the human security agenda continues to "occlude and distort imperial relations" in the way that more traditional "Westphalian terms of reference" do. 55 50 Mama and Okazawa-Rey, 'Militarism, conflict and women's activism in the global era.' 51 support, and so on, are subject to empirical and historical specificity, and a common rubric of militarism helps us understand similarities and differences between them.
Working in a historical sociological tradition, Mabee and Vucetic draw up a typology of forms of contemporary militarism. 61 They contrast Michael Mann's concept of civil society militarism -"the use of organized military violence in pursuit of social goals that is 'state-supported, but not state-led'" 62 -to "nation-state militarism" in both its authoritarian and liberal forms; to "neoliberal militarism" structured around socioeconomic liberalisation; and to "exceptionalist militarism" seen in practices associated with the War on Terror. Feminists tend not to operate in such formal typological ways, but have long been articulating the idea of war and militarism as a spectrum or a system, in which the forms, intensities and characteristics may vary, but the gendered basis of violence is central. 63 And a focus on militarism can be usefully mobilised to consider the connections and feedback loops between Northern and Southern practices, giving a more internationalised account that is better attuned to the operation of power in contexts of armed violence. Indeed, Abrahamsen refers to "global militarism in Africa" because "while militarism is always specific (and often national), it is also simultaneously global," policy-oriented concepts such as security sector reform. 65 As Abrahamsen argues, "The securitization of underdevelopment … is the condition of possibility for a global militarism justified in the name of human security and development." 66 We must take heed of Abrahamsen's warning that "Paradoxically, transformations that initially entailed a critique of militarization and militarism have ended up according a new importance to security actors and laying the groundwork for new expressions of militarization and militarism." 67 Human security has -against its self-image as a progressive social forcefacilitated a resurgent as well as transformed militarism.
Controversies and Silences in the Arms Trade Treaty
Having thought through the relationship between militarism and human security, arms market. This is seen as compatible with human security: it provides "more economically based reasons for supporting the international, norm-building approach" associated with human security. 68 EU member states expended significant energy trying to get the USA, as the world's largest arms exporter, on board. And the UK, France and US, in particular, were keen to incorporate China and emerging Southern exporters into a common regulatory regime. Although not highly visible during the treaty negotiations, the arms industry of western states -for the most part formally (but not substantively) separate from the state, unlike in many non-western states -also took this position, on the basis that the treaty could bring "a definite comparative advantage to the defence industry." 69 A third understanding of the ATT's purpose is based on sovereignty: the concern that the treaty may hamper states' ability to import weapons and transfer them as they see fit. This account was primarily articulated by Southern states, often with nationalised military industries. These include growing military producers such as China and Brazil; major importers such as India; regional antagonists such as Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and India; leftist Latin American states such as Venezuela and Cuba; and the three states that voted against the treaty, North Korea, Iran and Syria. Sovereignty was also a strong theme of the US position, however: weapons transfers are a "sovereign decision" premised on state's right to engage in foreign policy as it sees fit, and its opposition to any overarching authority being able to tell states how to interpret the treaty. 70 In this account, there is emphasis on states' legitimate interests in trading materiel, equipment and technology for political, security, economic and commercial reasons. contemporary militarism -including one inflected by human security -come into conflict over specific empirical issues.
Defining the "illicit and unregulated" trade
The ATT is designed to prevent and eradicate the "illicit and unregulated" trade in weapons. The term "illicit" is not defined in the treaty text, due to dispute over its meaning that has simultaneously facilitated and plagued multilateral action on weapons issues for over two decades. 75 That is, the "illicit and unregulated" formulation is both the Several Southern states also insisted on the exclusion of any language of socio-economic development, and on the insertion of language of "objective and non-discriminatory" application of treaty criteria. States' statements to the UN set out the context in which these demands make sense: fear that discriminatory and subjective criteria will be used as a tool of interference; opposition to western double standards and hypocrisy; concern that the ATT will be used as a means of curtailing the right to trade in arms and that law will be used as cover for political decisions; fear of regime change; opposition to occupation and the use of force; and emphasis on asymmetry in production. 82 Set against the legalistic, sovereignty-based definition of the illicit trade was a broader definition promoted by European and several Sub Saharan African, Latin American and Caricom states, the USA, and NGO advocates and campaigners. In this, the use to which weapons are put is more important than the legal identity of the recipient.
"Illicit" thus means that transfers can be authorised by states, but still be irresponsible and thus illegitimate because they contribute to human rights and IHL violations. The Africa Group, negotiating on behalf of most of Sub Saharan Africa, initially articulated a more state-centric vision of the ATT until "lobbying from African civil society and churches, Control Arms and other maximalist states" persuaded them to change position and tone to "reflect human security concerns" 83 alongside the demand for a ban on transfers to non-state actors. This broader definition resonates with a feminist critique of militarism that seeks to make connections between the legal and the illicit: just because transfers are authorised does not make them legitimate.
However, on the flipside, a use-based definition of the illicit trade also means that transfers to non-state actors can be argued to be legitimate: for the USA and European states, supplying non-state actors is not synonymous with the illicit trade. EU member states and the USA already have regulatory systems based on end-use practices, make strong normative claims about the consistency between their values and arms export policies, and yet also regularly export weapons (to states and non-state actors) that violate human rights. 84 The US government (and, less vocally, European states) was unequivocally opposed to a ban on transfers to non-state actors (whilst also articulating an anti-terrorism position), so as to retain freedom of action in national security and foreign policy, and in line with its redline on controls on civilian possession. 85 The ways in which this broader use-based definition can be mobilised to both restrain and promote arms transfers shows the importance of foregrounding the imperial dimensions of a feminist argument. That is, whilst a use-based argument can be mobilised to restrict a greater range of transfers by delegitimising those that are authorised but still irresponsible, activists need to be alert to the risk of co-option by states who themselves have problematic transfer practices and seek to mobilise liberal commitments for reputational purposes. 86 The main axis of contestation in the definition of the purpose of the treaty is the role of the state in authorising or directing transfers, whether overtly or covertly. In the eventual treaty text, the US' refusal to countenance a ban won out; there is no explicit ban on transfers to non-state actors in the treaty. The compromise was that the Preamble to the treaty underlines the need to prevent the diversion of weapons to the illicit market, "or for unauthorized end use and end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts."
This allows states to pursue a narrow or broad definition of the illicit trade, focused on use or identity, as they prefer; and to include a ban on non-state actors in their national systems if they so wish. This diplomatic fudge suggests that the overall framing of the treaty as one designed to combat the illicit and unregulated trade should not be seen as a human security victory over militarism, but rather an indication of how one form of contemporary militarism has taken human security on board and is in contestation with other forms.
Treatment of human rights and IHL
If the "illicit and unregulated trade" formulation provides the skeleton for the ATT, Articles 6 and 7 form its heart. They set a "floor not a ceiling" 87 of basic standards, in the form of prohibitions based on international law (Article 6), and national risk assessment 
Diversion and the treatment of ammunition
A key practice of the illicit trade is diversion, or re-transfer: when weapons do not end up with their stated end-user, or are used for an unauthorized purpose. Ammunition is particularly susceptible to diversion, because of the quantities in which it is transferred.
Under a distinct article of the treaty, States Parties are to "take measures to prevent" diversion, which can include, but does not require, refusing to authorise exports. 105 Parallel to this is the treatment of ammunition, also treated under its own article rather than being included as a category of equipment in the scope of the treaty. This means that, while the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 apply to ammunition, the article on diversion does not. So whilst diversion can, technically, be treated as strongly as the other criteria (as the provision is there to refuse a licence on these grounds), politically speaking the precision of the obligation is weaker than other criteria. In earlier drafts of the treaty text, there was no provision for ammunition, in concession to the US. 106 Other states also objected to the inclusion of ammunition during the negotiations -Russia, China, Canada India, Egypt among others -but it was the US that took the strongest line, making repeated and explicit proposals to exclude it. Amendments to the eventual treaty text were made to mirror US practice as far as possible, and "were part of the compromises made to get the US to vote for the final UNGA resolution [to adopt the treaty] and to keep Russia, China and other influential states from voting against it." 107
The ultimate formulation of diversion was constructed predominantly for the US' benefit, against the backdrop of its war in Afghanistan. The US military transfers ammunition to the Afghan National Forces, knowing that a proportion of it will inevitably be diverted and used against US troops. In 2009, for example, over half of a sample of rifle magazines found on Taliban casualties included bullets or cartridges identical to those provided by the US to Afghan government forces. There is a strong suggestion that ammunition procured by the Pentagon for Afghan forces has been diverted and then used against US troops. 108 The USA accounts for half of the world's medium and large calibre ammunition exports and a quarter of small calibre ammunition exports; it also already controls such transfers under national legislation. 109 So the issue is the US refusal to have regulation encoded in a multilateral instrument, rather than an unwillingness to regulate at all. The US government pressed for, and won, the exclusion of ammunition from the treaty's scope 110 and the separate and distinct treatment of diversion. This was despite the position of many African, Latin American and Caribbean states that the inclusion of ammunition in the scope of the treaty was "essential" for both state and human security concerns. 111 US war-fighting -a transnational and asymmetrical practice -and its relationship with a key client was thus central to the negotiation of the treaty. While the US claims that this is a treaty about bringing others up to its standards, those very standards are written in a way to facilitate US war-making and foreign policy practices.
Exclusion of domestic procurement and civilian possession
The examples so far have focused on disagreements; yet there was consensus on a key silence in the treaty as to what is to be regulated. States' military spending, arms production and domestic procurement are excluded from the remit of the ATT, as is the civilian possession of guns. Superficially, this is unremarkable: the ATT is a multilateral arms trade regulation treaty, focusing on international weapons transfers between states, rather than a disarmament treaty. States' sovereign right to determine their own military needs and govern their own domestic social relations is a strong counter to the development concern over what constitutes appropriate levels of spending or types of gun regulation law, and humanitarian concerns over the use of weaponry. Probing more deeply, however, we see fundamentally political questions at stake, around the role of organised violence in forms of political community and political economy.
Southern states made the loudest calls for the exclusion of domestic procurement:
Brazil and other emerging producers insisted on the exclusion of sustainable development as a criterion to be included as part of the national risk assessment, on the grounds this would intrude on states' right to determine their own spending priorities.
Other Southern states challenged asymmetry more directly, with states involved in regional antagonism, such as Pakistan and DPRK, criticising the global military imbalance occasioned by western military preponderance (in which western states are able to produce a higher proportion of their own weaponry and are thus less reliant on arms transfers, and also supply weapons to regional allies, friends and proxies) as the context in which debate about arms transfers takes place. 112 This Southern emphasis on sovereignty and asymmetry is indicative of the way nation-state militarism is shot through with North-South relations: many Southern states have post-colonial reasons for insisting on nation-state militarism. The bracketing of domestic procurement means that a significant portion of the arms trade is off the multilateral agenda. Yet military production is significantly internationalised, even for those states more able to produce more of their own equipment; 113 international concern remains primarily oriented towards southern states' practices, though.
Civilian possession was another US redline, and is the flipside of its position on transfers to non-state actors, as well as a good indicator of civil society militarism. The sacrosanct character of the Second Amendment in mainstream US debate generated ideological hostility from many quarters in the US to the "egregious provisions" of the ATT that pose a "pressing international threat to US gun owners." 114 Pro-control campaigners tried to deflect this pressure by reassuring them the ATT was not about civilian possession and domestic gun control issues would not be affected by it. 115 Strategically understandable from the point of view of trying to get the world's largest arms exporter on board with the negotiations, substantively this is a problematic position. Civilian gun markets are off the multilateral agenda because the ATT is about international transfers: but questions about the adequacy of the regulation of the US domestic market are important not only in terms of the racial and gendered politics of domestic gun violence, but also in terms of the regional circulation of weapons and their role in drug wars and organized crime. The USA has disproportionately high levels of firearm-related death and injury compared to other industrialized states. 116 More women were murdered by an intimate partner using a gun in the USA between 2001 and 2012 than the total number of US troops killed in action in the entire wars in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. 117 And gun violence but also gun control are racialized and gendered practices bound up with the very definition of citizenship in ways that are challenging for the gun control movement. 118 The US civilian gun market also plays a major role in regional gun crises in the Americas. Mexico, for example, has some of the most restrictive gun legislation in the world and was an early ratifier of the Arms Trade
Treaty. Yet more than 250,000 guns were purchased in the US and smuggled into Mexico between 2010 and 2012, in part facilitated by lax US regulations. 119 
Conclusion
The disagreements and silences of the ATT negotiations demonstrate the ways in which weapons circulation and regulation are marked by different forms of militarism.
The human security agenda has made significant inroads to international public policy and social science scholarship, and was an explicit driver of the ATT. Whilst there is much in the treaty that optimists see as having the potential to better control the circulation of weapons, the argument put forward in this article is that it is a mistake to see the treaty as a victory for human security over militarism. Rather, human security has both chipped away at some of the most egregious manifestations of militarism, been silent on others, and proved to be an accommodation with global militarism in its various forms. Human security, political economy and sovereignty came into contestation during the negotiations as expressions of different modes of militarism.
Weapons circulation takes places within a system: there is a world arms market (including legal and illicit strands) marked by asymmetry, hierarchy and transnational practices, in which many major exporting states that claim to care about human security, in particular European states, already participate in regimes based on ATT-like principles. Those that don't, or are ambivalent about such multilateralism -in particular Russia and China, and the USA, respectively -are sceptical about claims made on the basis of human rights and IHL. Claims to protect human security disconnect human rights and IHL violations from these patterns of military asymmetry and hierarchy, and generate resistance from non-liberal suppliers and recipients. So the human security agenda rests on the assumption that international politics can remain militarised in one way (the absence of efforts at disarmament or tackling military spending or military asymmetry) and yet be demilitarised in another (efforts to decrease the likelihood that weapons will be used in human rights or IHL violations), in ways that the examples discussed above suggest are untenable. Resistance to the ATT from a significant minority of Southern states may well be politically ugly, but needs to be understood in the context of asymmetry in the world military order, as does US dominance of the negotiations for a treaty to which it is a signatory but not a State Party.
In the desire to promote the spread of human security practices, there has been little attention to why an initiative such as the ATT might be resisted, beyond narrowly strategic or instrumental concerns or a failure to internalise human security norms. But militarism has been pushed off the agenda, precisely because it strikes at the core issues around war preparation and the constitution of political community and political economy, and because the maintenance of coercive capacities in the South is central to aid donors' and Southern elites' interests, not to mention the entrenched coercive orientation of Northern states' foreign policies.
For these reasons a human security agenda is limited in terms of its ability to generate more restrictive weapons transfer practices. However, it is also deeply interested, in the sense of having political effects. Human security has become a dominant policy orientation amongst aid donors and NGOs, is eminently fundable by donors who claim the mantle of benevolence without wanting to change their weapons transfer practices, and has been mobilised in scholarship in pursuit of a normative project. While the practical gains made by any treaty will always be partial, the more significant ramification is that the gains made in the ATT help set the parameters of politically feasible action, and obscure some of the core political projects that are sustained by the circulation of weapons.
